Dr. Eran Omri

Department: Computer Sciences

Position: Academic Manager of the Center for Cyber Technology, Ariel University of Samaria

Eran Omri is a staff member of the Computer Sciences Department at Ariel University. He completed his doctoral studies in 2009 at Ben-Gurion University under the guidance of Prof. Menachem Kojman and Prof. Amos Beimel. In 2009 he served as a post-doctoral student for half a year at Ben-Gurion University, under the guidance of Prof. Kobi Nissim. From 2009–2012 he served as a post-doctoral student at Bar Ilan University under the guidance of Prof. Yehuda Lindell. In 2012 he served as a post-doctoral student for half a year at Tel Aviv University under the guidance of Dr. Yiftach Haitner.

Eran’s main research areas are Theory of Cryptography, Secure Computation and Computation Privacy. Eran manages a number of projects that use theoretical knowledge from the field of Cryptography and private computation to solve problems from the area of protection in the cybernetic realm.


In the first project, we research foundational questions in cryptography that touch on the existence or absence of various cryptographic schematics in a number of computational models. In this research, we also emphasize the complications of private computation. Read more…

In the second project, we work on developing tools for systems to identify cyber-attacks which allow a number of organizations to collaborate. To this end, we use cryptographic tools for secure computation and methods for safeguarding differential privacy. Read more…

In the third project, we work on developing tools and implementation of efficient protocols for secure computation. Read more…

Interesting Questions (or alternately, possible research subjects):

Implementation of efficient protocols for secure computation. In particular, we will interest ourselves in the computation of functions, which on the one hand will help a number of organizations to collaborate in order to defend against cyber-attacks, and on the other hand will preserve the privacy of the information belonging to each of the organizations and the end-users of each organization.

The complications of various cryptographic schematics. It is known that most of the cryptographic schematics require reductions in difficulty. The question is: what are the minimal reductions [or assumptions] sufficient for the existence of various schematics? Astonishingly, this question is still open, both concerning the most basic primitives (for example, tossing a coin, differential privacy).

Secure computation without an honest majority. Until a few years ago, the consensus among leading researchers was that it’s not possible to compute “interesting functions” in a secure manner so that all sides will always receive output. In a series of articles in recent years, interesting functions were revealed that enabled this type of computation, and also suggested new ways to ensure partial security. However, there is more unknown than known, and it will be very interesting to characterize the collection of functions that we can compute with complete security, and also to find additional ways to define and achieve partial security.